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tage general dont joui t le pays, par suite de la publication de ces 
debats judiciaires, contre-balance largement I 'inconvenient cause 
aux particuliers dont la conduite peut etre l'objet du proces. ' 9 
9 Par Lawrence J. dans Paffaire R. v. Wright (1799) 8 T .R. a la p.298, 
cite avec appobation clans Wason v. Walter (1868) L .R . 4 Q.B. a lap. 88. 
SOME THOUGHTS ON NATURAL LAW AND 
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VINCENT A. DE GAETANO 
WAY back in 1950, William J. Kenealy S.J ., then Dean of the Boston 
College Law School, delivered an address at a testimonial banquet 
in honour of twenty· six members of the Federal, State ··and Muni d-
pal Judiciary, alumni of the School of Law of Loyola University, 
New Orleans. The opening paragraph of the address ran as follows: 
tThe majesty of the law? In what does it consist? In marble 
columns or high-backed leather chairs or black silk robes? No. 
These are but external symbols of an inward majesty. Does it con· 
sist, then, in that in visible force which al ways lurks behind the 
bench: the battalions of police, the regiments of soldiers, the 
battleships and bombing planes, which can be summoned to put 
teeth into a nation's laws? No. lt is not force. At least not physi-
cal force. For the true majesty of the law is more than its coercive 
sanction. It is a moral power, springing from a rational people's 
conviction that they see, enshrined in their courts, one of the few 
enduring elements of civilised life. It is a moral power, arising 
from a free people's realisation that the law is the means, under 
Divine Providence, of enjoying in security the inalienable rights 
founded in their human nature by the natural law. It is a moral 
power, flowing from a moral people's persuasion that the adminis-
tration of just human law demands their conscientious obedience, 
because it is their human participation in-the Eternal Law of God.' 1 
To many the whole tone and content. of the above paragraph will 
sound archaic and overcharged with religious sentiment. It is not, 
1 Loyola Law Review, June, 1950. 
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of course, surprising that it does sound so. ln an age where any 
notion of the 'Eternal Law of God' is bigotry and adherence to an 
objective moral code is narrow-mindedness, it might even be sur-
prising to find anything along these lines in a modern law journal. 
It is, in other words, a question of fashion (using the ~·ord with all 
its post-Victorian connotations). 
But fashion and taste, on their own, will not explain many things; 
they do not help us explain, for instance, the growing irreverence 
iri certain sectors of Maltese society toward law and·an increasing 
popular antipath.y toward the judiciary, lawyers, and the legal pro· 
fession generally. 
A prejudice against lawyers is, of course, not an .exclusively 
modern phenomenon. Lawyers have been excluded from every 
Utopia from the cirne of Plato -to H.G. Wells. In the Middle Ages it 
was popularly. said of St. Ives, the patron saint of lawyers, 
Sanctus lvo erat Breto 
advocatus sed non latro 
res miranda populo. 
Perhaps the traditional popul~r antipathy to the legal profession is 
a product of the natural tendency to blame human ills indiscri-. 
minately upon human leadership; 2 possible it" arises from an in· 
stinctive distrust of many men toward minds more subtle than their 
own; maybe it springs from an unthinking resentment against the 
curbing of selfish desires in the interest of the common good and 
ordered liberty; certainly, some of it is born in an ignorance of the 
genuine public necessity of ~any legal rules which work undeniable 
hardship in particular cases; and undoubtedly, it is nurtured by the 
fact that law is still essentially the monopoly of lawyers . .OnE- will 
recall, for instance, the power enjoyed by, and the corresponding 
antipathy shown toward, the pontifices in the early period of Ro· 
man Law until its 4popularisation' with the ius Flavium and .the lex 
Ogulnia. 3 Most of the adverse criticism of the legal profession is 
grossly unjust; some of it is richly deserved .. And where such cri· 
ticism is just, neither the lawyer nor the law student should emul· 
ate the ostrich and bury an unseeing head in the sand, but should 
face up to it and make an intelligent effort to .evaluate it. 
The substantial criticism can be viewed under two main head-
2 There are twenty members of the lega 1 profession io the prese.nt. House of 
Re prese nta ti ves. 
3 Jolowicz (a.nd Nicholas), Hist. Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 
3rd. ed., pp. 88·91. 
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ings: one of personalities and the other of philosophical principles. 
One of history's most obvious lessons is this: that to the un· 
thinking mind - which is more common than we like co admit -
nothing so obscures high ideals as the unworthy personalities who 
falsely profess to defend them. Ex·President Nixon and some of 
his advisers are perhaps the most recent example of this in the 
field of public administration. Similarly, no.#ling so ruins the con• 
cept of famil.y life and conjugal love than the selfish, cruel and 
unfaithful parent. Nothing so debases die beauty of the liberal arts 
as the skilled technician who distorts his artistry for ignoble ends. 
No one can harm the Church as effectively and as disastrously as 
unpriestly members of her own clergy. :So also with the legal pro· 
fession . . Every lawyer, notary and legal procurator who looks upon 
his calling as a business instead of as a profession, and utilises 
his professional skill to prey upon the tragedies and conflicts of 
individual members of society, weakens the civic faith and loyalty 
of the ordinary man in the street by blocking from his sight the true 
nature and purpose of the law. Fortunately, since the commence· 
ment of British rule in Malta, we have had few, if any, ·cases of 
judges and magistrates removed from office for misconduct or for 
having forsworn their oath of office. 4 And al though the legal pro· 
fession does not lack members who use their profession as a 
screen and tool for huge financial dealings, personal revenge and 
political ambition, yet one may confidently assert that such per-
sons are in a minority. Nonetheless 'legal' scandals have a shock· 
ing impact on the public mind precisely because they contradict 
the high ideals sincerely embraced and practiced by the over-
whelming majority of the legal profession. . 
As harmful as such unworthy personal conduct may be, yet the 
second reason for the slow decline in respect for the law, ·the 
bench and the bar is probably far more dangerous, being more 
subtle and therefore less perceptible. ] refer to the gradual infil· 
tration of a philosophy alien not only to our legal system but to the 
Maltese way of life generally and the corresponding lack of enthu-
siasm shown in academic circles for Maltese Legal Philosophy. 
I doubt, of course, whether I am justified in writing about Ma/ .. 
tese Legal Philosophy as being distinct from, say, Italian, French 
or American Legal Philosophy. Scholasticism, utili cariani sm, dia· 
leccical materialism, existentialism: _these and a host of other 
'isms' are philosophical currents not particular co any given ter· 
4 To-day sections 10 and 18, C.O.C.P. 
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ritory. 5 What distinguishes, say, American from Italian Legal Phi-
losophy is not so much the content of that philosophy as the na· 
tionality - to use the word in its broadest and least technical 
sense - of the writers on the subject. Italian Legal Philosophy is 
distinct from American Legal Philosophy principally because there 
is .:l body of Italian writers on legal philosophy distinct from a 
body of American writers on the same subject. 
The legal profession is both a learned and a practical one. 
Lawyers and judges have a responsibility both in thought as well 
as in conduct. The legal system of every nation is profoundly af-
fected by the phffosophy which dominates the leaders of its legal 
professicin. Justice cannot be administered in vacuum, without re-
gard to a fundamental philosophy of life, of law and of government. 
I confess to Ii td e patience with those who cannot see the place of 
philosophy in the law. Philosophy shapes the law, whether cus-
tomary law, or case·law (gurisprudenza), -or codified law, or Acts 
of Parliament. It may be difficult to see, at first glance, any philo-
sophy in the decisions of our courts. But implicit in every deci-
sion, no less than in every sentence, where the question is, so to 
speak, at large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of law and of 
its sanction; a philosophy which, however veiled, is in truth the 
final arbiter. Very often the philosophy is ill co-ordinated and 
fragmentary. Neither lawyer nor judge, pressing forward along one 
line or retreating along another, is conscious at all times that it is 
philosophy which is impelling him to the front or driving him to the 
rear. Nonetheless it is there. The same may be said of our codi· 
fied law and the institutes therein contained: minority, tutorship, 
lease, sale, prescription, bankruptcy - philosophy moulds chem 
all. It is not, therefore, a question of keeping philosophy out of 
the law, but of what philosophy shall go into the law. 
It is pertinent, at this stage, to ask: what philosophy has, so 
far, gone into our legal system? I do not propose to draw a detailed ~ 
picture of the philosophy which has shaped the le gisl atlon of these 
islands, and this, .for three reasons. In the first place it is difficult 
to pinpoint .with any degree of accuracy the moment in time when 
5 However, certain currents of thought can be identified with a particular 
territory by reference to philosophers who initially propounded or sub-
sequently supported a particular philosophy. We still speak of, say, Con-
tinental Rationalists (e.g. Descartes, Spinoza) ~nd German Idealists (e.g. 
Fichte, Schiller). 
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Maltese legislation properly begins. 6 In the second place neither 
time nor the research facilities available make possible a detailed 
and scientific analysis of the topic in issue. Finally, any detailed 
exposi cion would be beyond the scope of this short essay. Indeed, 
a general knowledge of the history of Western society from c. 700 
A.D. to the cime of the French Revolution would suffice for the 
present purpose. 
The period comprised between c. 700 to 1550 A.O. (commonly 
known as the Middle Ages) is the period of the re·building of the 
Roman Empire. Western man sought to re·build this empire not on 
the strength of the Roman Legions but on the spiritual - and in 
due course of time, temporal - strength of the papacy, buttressed 
as it was by the Benedictine Rule and the monasteries which 
sprung up all over Europe. Eventually there emerged a· community 
which was neither Church nor State, but Christendom, and which 
reached the ap·ex of its internal stability in the twelfth century. It 
was within this political set up that the intellectual activity of 
Western Europe progressed, to culminate in the Renaissance • . 
Along with the revival of literature and the arts in general we find 
the revival of law and of philosophy. The revival of the study of 
law must not, however, be attributed solely to the glossators of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Professor Sou them writes: •Every 
notable pope from 1159 to 1303 was a lawyer. This fact reflects 
the papacy's pr~eminent concern with the fonnulacion and enforce-
ment of law. le was here that the papal position was strongest. At 
a time when the tradition of ancient law and government had been 
almost completely obliterated in Europe, the popes retained the 
elements of a legal system on which they could build. Besides this 
they could aim a legislative authority to which no other ruler of the 
West could aspire. Every circumstance of twelfth-century society 
favoured the rapid growth of papal law, and chis growth was given 
a steady impulse by the great succession of lawyer•popes - Alex· 
ander III, Innocent III, Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Boniface VIII. The 
fundamental order of medieval, ·and to a large extent of modem, 
society owes a great debt to these popes. They brought to their 
6 Harding H.W., History of Roman Law in Malta, R.U .M. , p. 24. But it must 
not be forgotten that even with the coming of the Knights the bulk of local 
law continued for quite some time to consist of Sicilian enactments, with 
the inevitable sub·strarum of Roman and Canon Law, and supplemented by 
the fus commune {itself Roman Law as interpreted through the centuries) 
and local customs. 
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task clarity of mind, firmness of principle, and a capacious prac· 
tical wisdom.' 7 These factors, together .with the immense authority 
wielded by the Roman Pontiffs and the extensive jurisdiction of 
the ecclesiastical courts, led to Canon Law interpreting the Civil 
Law itself where it was controversial, mitigating its rigciur where 
necessary, and adapting it co the Christian ouclook of life. Writing 
on the period immediately following the Norman conquest of these 
islands, Harding has this to say: 1It is (to this p.eriod) that we 
must look, rather than to the Roman occupation of Malta, if we wish 
to see the real influence of Roman Law. :Ac that time the Roman 
Law had recumed to its splendid heritage on the continent through 
the halls of the Bologna school. The religious reorganisation of 
Mal ta by the Normans contributed to its re·introduction in the 
Island since it placed our people, who had never completely for· 
gotten the Roman Law and who still enjoyed a substratum of Latin 
culrure and traditions, in continuous touch with ecclesiastics who 
were well versed in that law and followed its rules in many parts 
of the Canon Law, then, as now,. applicable to Malta. In fact it was 
principally through the agency of Canon Law, which was partly a 
Romanisation of the Church's customs and partly an attempt to 
adapt Roman Law to Christian and Medieval customs, that Roman 
Law acquired predominance in Malta, for it must be remembered, in 
the words of F erriere, that 110 spirito del diritto romano, che, ab-
bandonato a se stesso, sarebbe lungamente rimasto fuori dalle 
cose di questo mondo, diveni va una forza attiva ed operosa pas· 
sando nei precetti del diritto canonico". ' 1 ·. 
In short, as Judge Debono points out in his · Storia della Legisla-
zione di Malta, we owe to Canon Law 1il maggior rispetto al diritto 
dell 'umana personalica '. · 
And it is pr.ecisely this philosophy, the .phil.osophy of the in· 
dividual human personality, of man as a rational being endowed 
with certain inalienable rights which is the target of a subtle but 
sustained and determined attack. Subtle because it is sweetened 
with words and administered in small doses; sus.tained and deter-
mined because of the immense energies involved in its administra-
tion. Up to a century ago man knew pretty well when a thing was 
proved and when it was not. And if it was proved he really believed 
it. He still connected thinking with doing and was prepared to alter 
7 Southern R.W ., Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, 1970, 
p.131. 
1 Harding H.W ., op. cit., p.14. 
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life as a result of a chain of reasoning. But what with the weekly 
press and other such media, society has largely altered that. To· 
day's man has accustomed himself, ever since he was a boy, to 
have a dozen incompatible phil.osophies dancing about together in 
his head. He doesn't think of doctrines as primarily 'true' or 
'false', but as 'academic' of 1 conservative' or 'revolutionary'. 
Jargon, not argument, is to-day the best ally of any propaganda 
machine which wan ts to incroduce a new philosophy. Make man 
think this new philosophy is strong or stark or courageous or that 
tt 1s the phil"osophy of the future. The unthinking mind will accept 
it. 9 
In reality the conflict we are beginning to \\'.'.itness, on home 
ground, is the age-old conflict between the idea of the Absolute 
State (in its watered down version for the moment) and the idea of 
the Natural Law - a term which has been much distorted and the 
meaning of which has been greatly altered by both the positivist 
and the historical school of jurisprudence, and in our case, as in 
the case of most Catholic countries, by the interpretation of theo-
cratic philosophers who saw it as a means of furthering the 
Church's temporal power. 
We are all familiar with the p 1ilosophy of the Absolute State. Its 
modem name is totalitarianism, but its name is its only novelty. It 
is a retrogression to ancien·t Caesarism: the deification o.f the 
state upon the specious grounds of pragmatic public policy, to the 
annihilation of human personality. The public policy of the State is 
the alpha and the omega of all things, the ultimate criterion of 
·truth and the last norm of right. The logical conclusion of such a 
philosophy is that human life, its origin and purpose, its dignity 
and value have si·gnific~ce only by the yardstick of State utility. 
Will is substituted for reason; law becomes organised force; might 
becomes right. There are no inalienable rights10 and therefore quod 
principi placuit legis ha bet vigorem; 11 there are no inalienable 
rights because there is no natural law; there is no natural law 
because there is no eternal law; there is no eternal law because 
God is merely an appendage to political life, tolerated but not 
approved. 
9 Sce C.S. Lewis, Screwtape Letters. 
l 0 See E. Busuttil, The Frontiers of Human Rights, R.U.M., 1966. 
11 Ulpian, in Digest 1.4.1 pr. and 1. And the reason is: utpote cum Lege 
regia, quae de imperio eius la ta est, populus ei et in eum omne suum· im-
perium et potestatem con/erat. 
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The origins of modern totalitariansim may be traced back to the 
middle of the seventeenth century and in particular to Thomas 
Hobbes' theory of the Leviathan State. 12 Subsequent philosophers 
contribu·ced their share • . David Hume's skepticism cast doubt upon 
the ability of the human mind to attain any objective truth. Jean 
Jacques Rousseau's anti-intellectualism ca st aspersions upon any 
rational explanation of human life. J eiemy Bentham's utilitarianism 
repudiated the age-old norm of morality. Immanuel Kant drove a 
wedge between the legal and the moral orders. Herbert Spencer's 
sociological evolution cast aside fixed principles of morality and 
of the natural law. Austin's jurisprudence completed the legal 
bridge to the modern totalitarian State •. These phil.osophies, and 
the positiviscic concepts of Hegel, Marx and Spengler, melted down 
into an amorphous philosophy of so~called realism and pragmatism, 
are the ideas fighting for a secure bridgehead in Malta to-day. · 
That such a philosophy is essentially alien to our way of life 
should be patent to anyone in touch with the spirit of the Maltese 
people and their laws; it should be dear to anyone with an elem· 
ental knowledge of the language and substance of the declarations 
demanded (and often obtained, but equally often transgressed) from 
the rulers of these islands by the Maltese in defence of thei.c laws 
and customs. : In parci cular, the Declaration of The Rights of the 
Inhabitants of the Islands of Malta and Gozo (of 1802), which 
ushered in British Rule of Malta, contains, in a nutshell, what I 
submit are the essential principles of the legal and political phi-. 
losophy of these islands. 11 
Modern legal pragmatists pooh-pooh the very notion of the Na· 
tural Law as a medieval fiction, which served a useful purpose in 
its day, but is now obsolete, and never had any objective exis-
tence. To them, therefore, inalienable rights are so much meta· 
physical nonsense. There are no duties in conscience because 
morality, in its last analysis, is merely current good taste. :!here 
are no principles; there are merely prevailing formulae of ex· 
pediency. Above all there are no absolutes, that is, except prag-
matic public policy, which means the Absolute State. If it works 
it's true; if it works it's right. A rudderless philosophy, which 
leads, logically and psychologically, to the philosophy of force. 
12 Hobbes propounded the theory that the ruler (Leviathan) ·is above the 
law and ·need ·not obey it. Kant was greatly influenced by the philosophy 
of Hobbes. 
13 See J .J. Cremona, Human Rights Documentation in Malta, R.U.M., 1966. 
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And, make no mistake about it, no philosopher in history has ever 
pointed out another alternative between the natural law and physi-
cal force. It has always been one or the other. If then we do not 
want human law, our law, to be measured by the yardstick of phy-
sical force the only alternative is the yardstick of the Natural Law. 
What does this latter yardstick entail? 
There is involved in every practical judgement of the reason the 
claim that something· is meet, good or right to be done. 14 That is a 
truth of psychology; but (to confine the discussion to a legal con-
text) even iri connection with Austin's Command Theory, which 
taken at its face value is brutally non-moral, Buckland says that 
:he (Austin) would have agreed that the law is an outcome of many 
causes and that iri the long run it expresses a morality ..• That 
does not mean a moral code of conduct but a set of rules as to 
what the legislator thinks it desire able that people should be made 
to do - a very different matter. ' 15 But not such a different matter 
that it is not similar in an important way. It is an admission that 
law is a judgement in terms of the good, whether that good is real 
or apparent. Just as every judgement, whether speculative or prac-
tical, contains an implicit claim to truth, so in particular the prac-
tical judgement claims that it is true that it is good that something 
should be done. This propositional truth, reflecting the being or 
nature of the siniation, is what gives the ultimate form, definition 
or limit to the judgement. When the truth is absent the defining 
limit is breached; when an impossibility is asserted, openly or 
covertly, the judgement has passed ~nto what the Pythagoreans 
called the apeiron - the boundless chaos where anything can be 
predicted of anything because everything is nothing. 
Human law, therefore, presupposes and includes assertions that 
pretend to truth. We can account for the fact that it is not wholly 
reducible to them by saying that scientific laws describe being 
and do not depend on will, -whereas human laws prescribe -the good 
and are imposed by will in order that the good may be effected in 
and by the wills of the subjects. Both declare what might be called 
universal patterns of behaviour, but while the scientific pattern 
cannot but be realised, the human pattern may not be. It is this 
potential characteristic of human law which gives rise to questions 
about its obligation and scope, que scions which ultimately boil 
14See The Limits of Law and Legislation by Ivo Thomas, in The King's 
Good Servant, ed. R. O'Sullivan, 1948. 
15 Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence, p. 48. 
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dovm to the single question 'When is a law not a law?• 
Logicians are accustomed to treat as a single 'null class' all 
classes which have no members, or, in some systems, those which 
involve contradictory notions. Similarly we may term 'null state-
ments' in the spe01lative order those which state either mere 
falsehoods or impossibilities, and in the practical order those 
which prescribe as meet to be done what it is not or cannot ever 
be good for man to do. The law which prescribes something morally 
permissible but factually unsuitable has breached its defining, 
limiting boundary of goodness and truth; the law which is neces-
sarily bad is altogether in the apeiron, the undefined, unlimited 
chaos of nothingness where no laws oblige, for there are no laws 
to oblige. It does not mean, however, that enactments which are 
not laws in this moral sense may not be laws iri a purely 1 egal 
sense, or that they may not have very practical consequences. In 
the logic of classes the 'null class', which by definition has no 
members, is a working convention which can be operated upon like 
other classes. The number 'O' for instance may be defined as the 
class which has the null class as its sole member, a definition 
which enables the logician to generate the series of cardinal num• 
bers. To the logic of classes the null class is as important as the 
cipher is to numerical calculation. The enactments of a legislator 
have a prima facie claim to be law in the moral sense and, even if 
they are outside the moral order, may make good their claim to be 
obligatory law in a purely civil sense. 
This distinction between necessary and factual falsehood and 
badness is equivalent to that which Thomas Aquinas makes be· 
tween laws that are contrary to divine good and those that are 
contrary to human good. 16 Even the latter he calls magis violentiae 
quam leges, and in their regard quotes St. Augustine: lex esse non 
videtur quae justa non fu~rit. 11 Such a conception goes back to 
Cicero and ultimately to Plato. In fact it was Cicero who said that 
a commonwealth in which the common good, the res populi, is not 
being sought is no commonweal th. 18 These laws that are contrary 
to human good are not binding in conscience; but unlike the laws 
which are contrary to divine good it is sometimes permissible or 
even obligatory to obey them, for law is made to secure the order 
and peace of society. Bad law militates against that end, but dis-
16 Summa Theologiae, 1-11, 96, 4. 
17 De Libero Arbitrio, I. 5. 
11Quoted in De Civitate Dei, II, 21. 
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obedience to it may militate against it even more. If it be not im-
mediately contrary to divine good, bad law has broken its defining 
limits, but has not passed altogether beyond them. Many who will 
not allow jurisprudence to take account of morality fai l co recog-
nise this point, as do those who believe that insistence on a higher 
standard of human action than human law makes for anarchy. So 
far from holding chat human lawas such is morally suspect, Thomas 
Aquinas maintains that it is in general an external source of moral 
principle. Even man-made law is binding in conscience. Bue human 
legislators are fallible and when their enaconencs are unjust they 
bind, if at all, in virtue of the law of nature which prescribes that 
a man should live at peace with his fellows in human society. To 
live at peace with God is a higher duty still which may involve a 
refusal of obedience to man-made law. 
How can we assess this frontier of goodness which a law must 
have if it is to be genuine? No one with experience of human af-
fairs would ask for a yard sci ck that would give public and uniform· 
ly acceptable assurance of the exact status of any law to which it 
might be applied. There are, however, some constants intrinsic to 
man which provide a matrix for the fonnation of law and a canon of 
its goodness. There are (a) the desire for the preservation of the 
self; (b) the desire for the continuance of the self; ( c) the desire 
for the perfecting of the self. Since these desires· are constants in 
man, it should not be thought that they represent a merely human 
good; they are features of human nature as it comes from the Cre· 
ator. Hence, in so far as a law goes contrary to the general satis-
faction of them, it will be contrary to what is good for man as 
such, contrary to the good of its subjects in 'Whatever siruation 
they may be, contrary therefore to its own nature as law, and 
hence lacking its due definition or limitation. It will further be 
contrary to what Thomas Aquinas calls a divine good. 
One need hardly state that such ideas have been widely aban· 
doned by legal theorists on a variety of grounds; partly perhaps 
because much of modern legislation might not show up well when 
compared with this standard, partly because the growth of law as a 
closed system has been accompanied by an independent abandon· 
ment of universally recognised moral standards by many people. If 
however legal theory is treated as a closed system with respect to 
moral theory, if legal rights are held to be ultimate and not finally 
to depend on moral rights, there seems no avoidance possible of 
making force the supreme arbiter of right and wrong. 
Human law, then should be concerned Vlith the common good of 
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the community. But again~ the term 'common good' requires some 
explanation. 19 
In a multitude of ways we are all busy considering the relation• 
ship of the individual to the community and the adjustment of 
claims between them. The individual makes claims to rights and 
liberties which the community at times calls on him to sacrifice 
for the sake of the common welfare. Must he do so? May he resist 
the cl aims of the community? How far may he be coerced? Are the 
interests of the one and the many irreconcilable? How exactly are 
they related? These are questions of some immediate importance 
as we see the steady encroachmeo.t of the claims of the State on 
our own lives at the present time. In more concrete form the ques· 
tions could be framed as follows: Is there a limit beyond which the 
State should not tax one or other class of its citizens? Has the 
Government the right to impose the dosed shop by law? May the 
State confiscate private property? The final question which sums 
them all up is, of course, Is the State for the citizen or the citizen 
for the State? 
It will help, first, to examine the nature ·of the group that is the 
State, and of its unity. Every group is constituted in view of some 
end. It is the end or purpose which determines the nature of a so· 
ciety, gives it its exttirisic form and provides _ its extrinsic unity, 
determining the direction of the society. The intrinsic unity fol· 
lows, a product of that authority which arises in the society from 
the impulsion of the members toward a commop end. This unity 
which exists in any society and particularly in the State is not an 
accidental unity such as exists in a heap of stones, or an artificial 
unity such as exists in a house or a machirie; nor is it a unity of 
composition such as exists in a chemical compound. It is a unity 
of order, which comes into existence because of the end or the 
good which- is being pursued. This unity does not absorb the ac• 
tivity of the "individual members of the society, as other fonns of 
unity do with their constituent parts, but supposes their activity, 
co-ordinated in view of the common end. n.is activity of the in· 
di vidual s in the society .may be compared to that of soldiers in an 
army or to men towing a boat. There is an activity of the parts 
whicb is also the activity of the whole, such as the actual fighting 
or the -towing. But this is not the whole of the activity of the parts. 
19 See La Notion Thomiste du bien Commun, by Suzanne Michel°(l932), and 
The Person and the Common Good, by Jacques Maritain in Review of · 
Politics (Notre Dame, .Indiana), -October 1946. 
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There is, so to speak, a residue of activity which may be con• 
cemed with oth~r things, such as eating and sleeping, and need 
not be directed to the fighting or the towing. 21> 
Hence a society, a group, or a State is not an organism or an 
organic unity in the sense that the acti~ity of the organs is to• 
tally consµmed in the activity of the or_ganism. It is not a sub· 
stantial reality. It has no personfllity in the metaphysical sense. It 
is not even som.ething distinct from its members • . It is simply the 
members themselves considered from a particular point of view, 
acting in a certain way. It is not an organism but an organisation. 
When ~ society comes into existence it is nqt a new thing that is 
born, but a new state_ of things. This point needs emphas.is ac the 
present time, pa:'rticularly with regard co the power and claims of 
the Stace. The one na~ral God-given unit in human life is the 
family. :Many families together make a State and the State enjoys 
what ~e call a moral personality. :But the State is not and never 
can be a real person, nor can ic enjoy a reality independent of its 
constiments, citizens and families. It is at most a ~fictitious per· 
sonalify'. As a moral entity tht: State exists to subserve the ends 
of the only realities - its citizens. : ~1d the common good of the 
community· is the good of its constituent members and ultimately 
chat good is the right of each to th~ free pursuit of the good _life. 
Now, as individuals, men possess certain goods, chiefly in the 
material order, such as wealth, heal th and bodily integrity. As 
persons they posses'S certain rights such as the right to life, the 
right · co truth, the .right to found and rear a family, -the right· to po s• 
sess property. And since a society is a unity of order among not 
merely individuals but among persons, t'he good of the society must 
be related in som·e way tO personal goods and rights. The common 
good of the group cannot be compared to the good of the one quite 
in the · same waY. as the whole is compared to the pare, ·or as a 
· society is compared to its members. The society has no persona-
lity while the me·mbers are persons. Yet the society is in some way 
the support and defence of personal goods and the maintainer of 
personal values. Hence we cannot too easil.y ·say th at the personal 
good of a single membet muse override the common good of society. 
There is a scale of values in which· the protection of the personal 
rights of the. totality cakes precedence over the protection of those 
of the sin_gle person: while the personal good of the one transcends 
the individual good not only of the one but also of the many. We 
20_Summa T •• I, 3, 1. 
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should, therefore, say that the relationship between private good 
and common good is both quantitative and qualitative. The test of 
value is quantitative only irt defect of a qualitative criterion, or 
rather, within ea<!h qualitative sphere or range. Hence, the gocd of 
the one, considered as an individual, is subject to the good of the 
many. There is a quantitative relationship, and in a conflict of in-
terests the good of the one may be ogliged to yield to the good of 
the many. But the good of the one, considered as a person, can 
never be sacrificed for the good of the many. 
How does one relate these ideas to modem legislation? Once 
more I will evade any detail.ed examination of recent drafting, pro-
posing the application of the test of the common good in a general 
way.21 
Let me take a couple of examples. :The right to property, for in-
stance. This is a personal right which the ~ommunity may not deny 
to one of its members. Immediately one thinks of schemes of na-
tionalisation. :Clearly any form of nationalisation which would de· 
stroy the personal right to property, for example the total national· 
isation of land, would be contrary to the common good. There are, 
on the other hand, forms of nationalisation which can be justified 
when really necessary for the common good: public utilities, com• 
municacions, vital industries. 
Take also the right to cruth. Just as a single human being is 
bound to avoid the lie in creating with another because the other 
has a personal right to the truth, so is the govemmen t of a State in 
dealing with its citizens and more especially in dealing with other 
governments. 1bis must be specially underlined at a time when the 
public lie has become a deliberate instrument of policy in the do· 
mestlc and international practice of numerous governments. 
The. above are, briefly, what I believe to be the basis of the phi· 
losophy of the Natural Law, a philosophy as old as the thought of 
civilised man. Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle; Cicero, Terrullian, 
Justinian; Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Albertus Magnus, Thomas 
Aquinas, Vittoria, Suarez, Bellarmine; Bracton, .Langton, Coke, 
Blackstone, Burke; Marshall, Storey, Kent, Maritain and a host of 
others have contributed to its development. 
The philosophy of the Natural Law is not specifically Catholic, . 
or Protestant, or Jewish. It is the philosophy which is logically 
antecedent to the theology of every religion. It is the philosophy of 
21 See The Common Good in Law and Legislation by Andrew Beck, in ·The 
King's Good Servant, ed. R. O'Sullivan, 1948. 
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the pagan, in the classical sense of the word pagan, namely, he who 
worships God al though without the benefit of supernatural revel a· . 
tton. 
This philosophy maintains that there is in fact an objective 
moral order, to which human societies are bound to conform, and 
upon which the peace and happiness of personal, national and in· 
ternational life depend. The mandatory aspect of the objective 
moral order we call the Natural Law. In. virtue of the natural law, 
fundamentally equal human beings are endowed by their Crear:or 
with certain natural rights and obligations which are inalienable 
precisely because they are God-given. :Tuey are antecedent, there· 
fore, ooth in nature and in logic, to the formation of civil society. 
They are not granted by the beneficence of the State .. 
The construction and maintenance of a corpus juris, implement· 
ing the Natural Law, is a perpetual and monumental task demanding 
the constant devotion of the best brains and the most mature scho· 
larship of our legal profession. :For the fundamental principles of 
the Natural Law, which are as universal and immutable as the hu· 
man nature from which they derive, nevertheless require rational 
application to the constantly changing _political, economic and 
social ·conditions of society .. The ~pplication of the Natural Law 
postulates change as the circumstances of human existence change. 
It repudiates a naive and smug complacency in the status quo • .It 
demands a reasoned acceptance of the good, and a reasoned re-
jection of the bad, in all that is new. :It insists upon a cri cical 
search for the better. It demands an exhaustive enquiry into all the 
available data of history, policies, economics, sociology and every 
other pertinent front of human knowledge. 
And, for primary i_mportance, it insists that the construction of a 
better corpus juris be made in the light of the origin, nature, pur-
pose and limitations of the State; and in the knowledge of the ori· 
gin, nature, dignity and desdny of man.-
